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interviewer effects, spiral of silence effects, and several contextual 
effects (such as the perception of safety or danger in a polling point 
in face-to-face polls). We analyze data from a state-level pre-election 
poll conducted in the State of Mexico on June 2011, two weeks prior 
to election-day. This poll included an embedded experiment about 
the placement of the voting question and recorded several contex-
tual variables that allow us to test for different possible sources of 
estimation error. In addition, this paper offers a brief review of pre-
election polling in Mexico during the last two decades, evaluating 
the polls’ performance in both national and state-level elections. This 
analysis is part (and certainly the first formal step) of a larger effort 
by polling firms and public opinion researchers, as well as by the 
Federal Elections Institute, to determine the most common causes 
of estimation error in Mexican pre-election polls. 
Key words: Pre-election polls in Mexico, sources of estimation 
error, experimental designs, spiral of silence effects, polling 
methodologies.
Resumen: En este artículo testeamos diferentes hipótesis que 
reflejan algunos de los errores de estimación más frecuentes en 
las encuestas preelectorales. Testeamos los efectos del diseño de 
los cuestionarios, del muestreo, del entrevistador, de la espiral de 
silencio y de diversos efectos contextuales (tales como la percepción 
de seguridad o de peligro en los lugares en que se realizan las en-
cuestas cara a cara). Analizamos datos provenientes de una encuesta 
preelectoral realizada en el estado de México en junio de 2011, dos 
semanas antes de la elección. Esta encuesta incluye un experimen-
to sobre el lugar de la pregunta sobre el voto en el cuestionario y 
registra distintas variables contextuales que nos permiten testear 
posibles fuentes de error en las estimaciones. Por otra parte, este 
artículo incluye una breve revisión de las encuestas preelectorales 
en México en las últimas dos décadas, y evalúa la performance de 
las encuestas tanto a nivel nacional como estatal. Este análisis es 
parte (y ciertamente un primer paso formal) de un esfuerzo mayor 
de las empresas encuestadoras y de los investigadores de la opinión 
pública, así como del Instituto Federal Electoral, por determinar 
las causas más comunes de errores de estimación en las encuestas 
preelectorales mexicanas.
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Introduction
What are the causes of estimation error in Mexican 
pre-election polls?5 This question may have several possible 
answers, but none of them was convincingly provided in 
2010, when the Mexican polling community failed to accu-
rately estimate (and foresee the result of) several state-level 
governor races. Some of these elections were complicated, 
indeed, as they confronted what was called an “unnatural 
alliance” of left and right parties, the PRD and PAN, against 
the old ruling party, PRI. In those states—Oaxaca, Puebla, 
and Sinaloa—the PRI continued to dominate even after 
alternation took place in many state governments since 
1989 and in the national government in 2000. The majority 
of public polls predicted a PRI victory in the three states, 
but the left-right opposition alliances ultimately won. A 
myriad of explanations were discussed, but none of them 
presented any evidence to support them. “Spiral of silence 
effects” was a popular argument this time (called voto 
oculto, or hidden vote), since those states were—according 
to most political analyst—“authoritarian” environments in 
comparison to other freer and more competitive states. If 
true, this may have been the case of Oaxaca and Puebla, 
but not so much in Sinaloa. Other explanations focused on 
sampling. Oaxaca and Puebla have substantially rural, poor, 
and indigenous populations, but sampling issues had not 
been a problem in those same states in previous elections, 
5 By “estimation error” we mean the difference between the survey esti-
mation and the result of the election.
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and it was certainly not the case in other similar states 
like Chiapas (another relatively poor and rural state with 
a significant indigenous population), where pre-election 
poll estimates have been relatively accurate in past years. 
Others pointed out problems of defective interviewer train-
ing and supervision, but many of the polling firms that 
were wrong in 2010 have also published accurate pre-
election poll estimates before and after that year, making 
it hard to accept that as a final explanation. Some political 
observers argued that the 2010 poor performance of polls 
was the beginning of their decadence (see Estévez 2010), 
unless some methodological adjustments were made. But 
which adjustments were appropriate? Not a single answer 
accompanied by systematic evidence was provided. Some 
suggested, for example, that face-to-face polls (which are 
still the great majority of election polls in Mexico, where 
there is a limited coverage of residential telephone lines) 
should no longer use a secret-ballot method and ask vot-
ing preferences directly, but no evidence was provided to 
support this suggestion—the polling community is not even 
convinced that this could be the main problem.
The errors of 2010 were an alarming experience for 
the polling profession in Mexico and a plate full of candy 
for its critiques. The polls failed to predict the winners 
and pollsters lacked a clear and solid explanation for this 
failure. This circumstance fed strong suspicions of data 
manipulation by some pollsters. The decadence argument 
kept playing during the months after the election as a re-
quiem in a funeral march, in which the polls’ credibility 
was carried away slowly. Nonetheless, several state-level 
elections were relatively well-predicted by pre-election 
polls only a year later, in July 2011. It may now seem clear 
that 2010 could have been an outlier of generalized errors. 
But the explanations of why this happened are still miss-
ing. As we will argue below, most elections in Mexico (at 
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the national and state levels) have been accompanied by 
good and bad polling estimations; a few elections have had 
almost every poll right, and virtually none, until 2010, had 
had a majority of polls wrong.6 
In this paper we aim to contribute to the search for 
explanations about polling accuracy (or lack of) in Mexico. 
This topic cannot be fully understood and documented 
with one paper or with the limited empirical evidence 
that we have at hand; but we hope that this paper begins 
a more formal and ambitious search by testing some of the 
hypotheses that pollsters tend to use when explaining why 
polls get it right or wrong, and switch to a more substantive 
debate that is based on empirical evidence rather than on 
beliefs or guessing Our objective is to provide evidence 
for a few hypotheses derived from a longer list and build 
upon the evidence as it accumulates in the road to the 2012 
presidential election. We hope that our findings contribute 
to the development of more experimental design in future 
elections and certainly in the 2012 presidential election. 
The hypotheses that we test in this paper have to do 
with both methodological concerns and theoretical ex-
pectations about voters’ responses and behavior. We test, 
for example, possible effects caused by the placing of the 
voting question, we comment on the use of a secret-ballot 
method vs. a direct question, and employ proxies for last-
minute changes of preferences and spiral of silence effects. 
We also analyze how the screening of likely voters works 
using different approaches, and we assess the impact of 
interviewer characteristics and supervision on the polling 
estimates. Our list of hypotheses even incorporates the in-
creasing difficulty that interviewers face in an environment 
of crime and drug trafficking. For example, interviewers 
6 See Romero (forthcoming) for an evaluation of the 2010 polls and testing 
of some hypotheses. 
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in the State of Mexico poll recorded the perceived risks 
and potentially unsafe situations in their polling point. A 
more formal listing of hypothesis and their justification is 
discussed below, as well as the primary poll that we used 
for this analysis. But before we get into the details of our 
research, it may be useful to summarize the experience of 
pre-election polls in the country, as a context for further 
discussion. 
Pre-election Polling in Mexico: A Brief Summary 
Political scientist Adam Przeworski (1991) once said 
that a democracy is a system where parties lose elections 
and also a system where electoral outcomes reflect the 
institutionalization of uncertainty. The establishment of 
a dominant-party regime, or a hegemonic party system, 
as Sartori (1976) called it, made elections a rather cer-
tain aspect of Mexican politics for many decades: the PRI 
would always win and there was no uncertainty about it. 
Consequently, pre-election polls were virtually inexistent 
until the 1980s, when the country began to experience 
increasing political competition and even to witness PRI 
defeats at the local level, especially in state capital cities and 
other important urban centers. In the 1988 presidential elec-
tion, there were there were very few national pre-election 
polls. At least one of them was not meant for the Mexican 
public, but for Spanish-speaking television audiences in the 
United States, while another one found some resistance to 
its publication in an environment where the media were 
still under tight government control (see Basáñez 1995). 
Since then, the country has witnessed a rapid process of 
political change, driven by several electoral reforms that 
have re-shaped Mexican politics, by a substantial increase in 
party competition, and by voters’ realignment into several 
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political options from what once was a single party regime. 
National, state, and local elections have become, in many 
instances, very close contests. In a changing political context 
like this, pre-election polls have established themselves as 
a normal component of the election campaigns, not only 
increasing their number in presidential elections but also 
their presence in state and local races.
Table 1. Final pre-election polls in Mexico’s 
national elections: Number of polls, average 
errors, and standard deviations
Number of “final” 
pre-election polls
Average error of all 
polls (Mosteller 3)
Standard 
deviation
Presidential elections
1994 9 3.10 1.85
2000 12 2.77 1.07
2006 16 2.38 1.04
Mid-term legislative elections
1997 6 2.79 1.11
2003 10 2.82 1.10
2009 8 1.64 0.70
Source: Moreno (2009) for the elections prior to 2009, and 
authors’ calculations for 2009, all based on Reforma’s record of 
pre-election polls.
As an illustration of this, in every presidential election 
since 1994, the number of national-level pre-election polls 
has increased7. According to a count made by Moreno 
7 Presidential elections in Mexico are held every six years and mid-term 
legislative elections every three years. Elections for state governor in 
the 31 states and the Federal District also take place every six years and 
there are elections of this type almost every year (a few exceptions have 
taken place in the last decade and a half or so that reflect changes in 
state legislation and scheduling).
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(2009a), the number of polls conducted and published 
between two and three weeks prior to the presidential 
elections, in most cases by different polling organizations, 
was nine in 1994, twelve in 2000, and sixteen in 2006. This 
is a count that considers only what is called the “final pre-
election poll”.8 The number also increased from six to ten 
polls from the 1997 to the 2003 mid-term legislative elec-
tions, according to that count, and decreased slightly to 
eight in 2009—perhaps as a result of the financial crisis 
that year. Moreno’s count also provided some raw estimates 
for the polls’ accuracy. Considering a Mosteller 3 method, 
the average error for all final polls published decreased 
from one presidential election to the next: an average of 
3.10 in 1994, 2.77 in 2000, and 2.38 in 2006.9 This can be 
seen in Table 1.
A somewhat similar trend is observed in the mid-term 
legislative elections, in which the most recent estimations 
have been the most accurate: as shown in the lower part 
of Table 1, the total average error was 2.79 in 1997, 2.82 in 
2003, and 1.64 in 2009. Considering that the standard de-
viations of these average errors may be a reflection of how 
consensual or different the pre-election estimates of the 
different polling houses are, we observe that the standard 
8 Several polling firms conduct a series of polls throughout the campaign. 
No tracking polls were published in those years, even though they were 
being conducted for parties or media. 
9 We use Mosteller 3 because it offers a standardized way to deal with the 
Mexican multi-party system, in which at least three parties tend to obtain 
a significant percent of the vote share, and still be comparable to the 
state-level cases with two-party local systems. The average approach in 
Mosteller 3 also allows us to add the standard deviation as a measure of 
collective poll performance in a relatively understandable way. Mosteller 
methods 3 (the absolute average error) and 5 (the difference in winner’s 
lead) are common methods for the assessment of poll accuracy, as the 
works conducted for the United States and Portugal have shown in 
recent years (see Traugott 2005; and Magalhães 2005). 
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deviation has also decreased; this means that there has been 
less disagreement between the different polling estimates. 
If a trend could be established from this short history of 
polling at the national level, we could argue that in Mexico 
the number of pre-election polls in national elections has 
increased, their overall accuracy has also increased, and 
the variance in estimation between the different polling 
organizations has decreased. (More polls, more accuracy, 
less disagreement). 
This information reflects the story of pre-election 
polling in national elections, but what about polling in 
state-level elections? At this level the information is less 
systematic but it is possible to still reach some conclusions. 
The data at hand give us a good idea of how different the 
performance of polls has been at the state-level in com-
parison to the national level, using the collection of data 
gathered by the Department of Public Opinion Research 
at Reforma newspaper since 1999. This collection consists 
of the final pre-election estimates for both Reforma and all 
other polling organizations that Reforma personnel was 
able to detect during the course of a campaign.10 
There are at least three limitations and one warning 
in regards to this data collection. The first limitation is 
that competitive elections at the state level go back to 
1989, when the PRI lost the first state-level race since 
1929. So this collection of data begins ten years after the 
first alternation in a governor’s office—still, the number of 
polls then was much more reduced. A second limitation 
is that the data only reflect those elections where Reforma 
conducted state-level pre-election polls and published a 
10 We thank Yuritzi Mendizábal and Rodrigo León for preparing this in-
formation, and to Reforma for making it available for further research.
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“final poll”11. Despite of this, the public opinion research 
unit at Reforma is one of the “polling houses” that has 
one of the largest coverage in the country when it comes 
to conducting pre-election polls, covering 78% percent 
of the state-level elections that took place from 1999 to 
2011.12 This is undoubtedly one of the most comprehensive 
collections of pre-election poll data that is available at the 
time of writing this paper. 
A third limitation is that the gathering of information 
was conducted from Mexico City, capturing the numbers 
and estimations of different polling houses that are na-
tionally known, and some local polls that were “visible”. 
The potential problem with this is that some local polling 
organizations and the publication of their work may have 
escaped this data collection. The warning is that the data 
collection by Reforma includes poll estimations by well-
known as well as by unknown polling houses, polls reported 
in journalistic stories, polls reported in political columns, 
and polls published as political advertising. There was no 
discrimination of the entries; but each poll was counted 
only once. Having said this, let us see what the state-level 
11 Our emphasis on “final polls” is based on the fact that they are the ones 
that yield the most accurate projections for the election. An interesting 
analysis of pre-election poll accuracy in Mexico considering polls pu-
blished during the campaign and even before candidate nominations 
can be found in Romero and Varela (2011); they show that the level of 
accuracy in all polls improves as election-day approaches, as it should 
be expected.
12 A total of 68 gubernatorial elections were held in the 1999-2010 period, 
including two extraordinary elections in Tabasco and Colima states. 
The number of elections in this count also considers two elections for 
Mexico City’s head of government (Jefe de Gobierno), and two elections 
in Mexico City for the Federal District Legislative Assembly, ALDF, in 
which Reforma published final pre-election polls.
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history of polls looks like according to the Reforma count 
and registry of poll results.13 
Table 2 shows information for 53 state-level elections 
held from 1999 to 2011 in which Reforma conducted and 
published a final pre-election poll. In those same elections, 
the newspaper’s polling unit recorded 217 final pre-election 
polls conducted by various polling organizations, including 
its own. These final pre-election polls had a total average 
error of 3.47 for the entire period (an average of averages) 
and a standard deviation of 2.33. The table also shows 
two periods that correspond to the electoral cycle, that is, 
when elections in the same states take place again: from 
1999 to 2004 (six years), and from 2005 to 2010 (six years). 
This information indicates that the most recent period 
actually had more polls on average per election, a lower 
average collective error, and a lower standard deviation 
(again: more polls, more accuracy, less disagreement). 
The number of elections considered in the most recent 
period, however, is lower than in the first (they should be 
about the same, but this reflects a reduced coverage by 
Reforma in its pre-election polling estimations in recent 
years). Because of this, we cannot argue with certainty that 
the trend is towards more polls, more accuracy, and less 
disagreement. But we can say that the collective average 
error is very similar in both periods. 
13 A much more exhaustive count and registration of poll estimates requires 
the systematization of information reported to the election authorities, 
both at the federal and state-levels. In Mexico, polling organizations that 
publish their results are required by election laws (federal and local) to 
report their methodology, their results and other aspects of their polls 
to the corresponding election authority. An undetermined number of 
reports for many years are available at IFE (for national and some local 
polls) and may be available in every state election institute, which gives 
a good idea of the titanic task that having this information in a single 
data set involves. 
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Table 2. Final pre-election polls in state-governor 
elections in Mexico: Number of elections, number 
of polls, average errors, and standard deviations
Number of 
elections
Number of 
polls
Average 
errors
(Mosteller 3)
Standard 
deviations
Years
1999-2011 53 217 3.47 2.33
Periods
1999-2004 30 97 3.51 2.37
2005-2010 21 100 3.33 2.27
2005-2009 17 73 2.58 1.65
2010 4 27 4.81 2.57
2011 2 20 3.99 2.52
Source: Election-specific data provided by Reforma’s De-
partment of Public Opinion Polling and authors’ calculations. 
It includes two elections for the Federal District’s Legislative 
Assembly. 
Table 2 also shows 2010 separately so we can observe 
the magnitude of the polling error in that particularly bad 
year, which increases to 4.81.14 In 2011, the start of a new 
election cycle and with only 3 state elections so far (Reforma 
conducted and published final polls in only two of them), 
the average error of all polls published went down again to 
14 Surprisingly, when we look at the year-by-year average errors for all 
elections and all published polls, 2010 is not the worst year. In 2000, 
several polls conducted by unaccounted (and perhaps inexistent) polling 
organizations, such as Technomanagment, yielded a total average error 
of 5.10. The average error for that particular “polling house” in the state 
of Morelos was 12.45! However, the 2000 average was also increased by a 
bad performance in a single state by a more well-known and reputable 
polling firm. The difference between 2000 and 2010 is that in the former 
there were a few very bad polls and several very good ones, whereas in 
2010 the bad estimates were more generalized, including the polls from 
various reputable firms. 
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an under-4 level. This shows that 2010 could have been, ef-
fectively, an outlier of bad polling performance. Regardless 
of that, the average error of pre-election polls published is 
greater than the sampling error that polling organizations 
usually report in their publications (which tend to vary from 
+/- 1.8 to 3.5 percent). Thus, the need to explain inaccuracy 
and to have a better understanding of the sources of error 
that are most common in Mexico remains. 
Testing for various sources of error in 
a state-level pre-election poll
The remaining of this article is devoted to the analysis 
of how different sources of error in a pre-election poll may 
affect the polls’ accuracy. Since our evidence comes mainly 
from one pre-election poll and a single election, we will be 
unable to generalize the results that we obtain, but, again, 
this is one of the most systematic attempts to understand 
the source of error in Mexico and what we hope to be a first 
step of a more systematic study of poll estimation error in 
the country. The discussion is organized in the following 
parts: a description of the data; a listing of hypotheses; a 
presentation and discussion of results; and a concluding 
section in which we point out some of the topics that could 
be covered in future research. 
Description of data
Unless otherwise indicated, our analysis is based on an 
actual state-level pre-election poll conducted by Reforma 
newspaper, in which we had the opportunity not only to 
include an experimental design on the placement of the 
voting question, but also to record several items that are 
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relevant to the testing of various hypotheses on estimation 
error. Such items are derived both from the respondents’ 
answers and from interviewers’ and supervisors’ observa-
tions. The poll was conducted in the State of Mexico on 
June 18-19, 2011, two weeks before the election for state 
governor, scheduled for July 3. As in many other states, the 
State of Mexico’s election legislation forbids the publication 
of public opinion poll results within eight days prior to the 
election and until after the polls close, which usually forces 
most polling houses to conduct their final pre-election poll 
for publication up to two weeks before election-day. The poll 
was conducted face-to-face in 80 polling points probabilisti-
cally selected from the list of precincts or electoral sections. 
Blocks and households were also probabilistically selected 
and then, in the last stage of selection, respondents were 
selected using quotas of sex and age.15 Fifteen interviews 
were conducted in each polling point. The refusal rate for 
the poll was 24%.
The poll results were published by Reforma on June 22, 
with seven days of campaigns still ahead and eleven days 
before the election. Actually, a televised debate between 
the three candidates for governor was held on the evening 
of June 22. Some observers argue that last minute cam-
paign effects not captured by the final pre-election polls 
conducted as early as the election laws allow may in fact 
explain a great deal of the polls’ inaccuracy (see Estévez 
2010). However logical this assertion is, no empirical evi-
dence has been gathered to support it in Mexico. The closest 
attempt is perhaps the journalistic reports from exit polls 
about the percent of voters who said they made up their 
15 A source of error that we are not able to test using this poll is the effect 
of quotas, since all respondents were selected using that criteria. In the 
sampling issues discussed below, we acknowledge the need to test for 
selection methods in the sample. 
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minds in the last few days before the election and even 
on election-day. In 2006, for example, a national exit poll 
showed that the largest proportion of late deciders chose 
the PAN presidential candidate, who ultimately won the 
election by only half percentage point (see Moreno 2009b: 
245). For 2010, Romero (forthcoming) finds no evidence 
of systematic biases on polls due to last minute events. 
In other countries evidence shows that a proportion of 
the electorate makes up their minds within two weeks of 
election-day (for the U.S. see Zaller 2004; ANES 2007. For 
the German case see Schmitt-Beck & Faas 2006. For the 
French case see Reuters 2007). Based on exit poll data Nir 
and Druckman (2008) conclude that those who decide 
their vote towards the end of the campaign are ambivalent 
voters who received mixed-information messages from 
the media in a highly competitive race. There is ample 
room for conducting more research in this area, but what 
we know now is that whether people will make a late vot-
ing decision depends on the type of election and media 
coverage. In fact, the prohibition of publication within a 
certain number of days from the election has been in ef-
fect for many years in Mexico, and all polls considered in 
the review of poll estimates in the previous section were 
conducted within this regulation. In many cases, the poll 
average error has been close to zero or well under one 
percentage point, so the claim that last minute changes 
may affect accuracy cannot be generalized. However, it 
certainly is a credible possibility in some elections, like 
the 2006 presidential race. 
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Table 3. Comparing the State of Mexico 
election results with the pre-election poll 
estimates under various treatments 
PRI PRD PAN Average error(Mosteller 3)
Difference 
1st – 2nd
% % %
Official election 
results (99%) 65 23 12 -- 42
Poll results:
With no treatment 63 23 15 1.7 40
Screened by likely 
voters (individual 
motivation)
66 21 13 1.3 45
Screened by likely 
voters (social or 
family motivation)
66 20 14 2.0 46
By voting question 
placement (near the 
beginning)
64 23 13 0.7 41
By voting question 
placement (near the 
end)
62 22 16 2.7 40
Combining likely 
voters screening 
(individual) and 
question placement 
(beginning)
69 20 11 2.7 49
Combining likely 
voters screening 
(individual) and 
question placement 
(end)
64 21 16 2.3 43
Filtered by likely 
voters and weighted 
by 2005 vote
59 26 15 4.0 33
Sources: State of Mexico Election Institute (IEEM) for the offi-
cial election outcome; and Reforma’s final pre-election poll in 
the State of Mexico (see methodological details in the text). 
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Table 3 shows a comparison of the election official re-
sults with the poll estimates. The latter are shown in different 
versions, as a way to start looking, if not quite at sources 
of error, at least to the possible effects of different treat-
ments employed. The first row shows the election results, 
followed by the raw poll results without any treatment. By 
treatment we mean weighting techniques or screening by 
likely voters. Voting is compulsory in Mexico but there is 
no sanction to those that do not turnout to the polls, and 
consequently turnout rates tend to be lower in comparison 
to other Latin American countries. Unless they take place at 
the same time of a national election, many state-level races 
actually have relatively lower turnout rates (between 40 and 
60%), and the State of Mexico is no exception. On July 3, 
2001, the state registered a turnout of 56% in the election 
for governor. Under these scenarios of low to medium levels 
of turnout, a screening of likely voters may help increase 
the accuracy of poll estimations. 
As shown, the raw poll results had an average error 
of 1.7, with errors of two and three points for the PRI and 
PAN, respectively (the poll’s reported maximum sampling 
error was +/-2.8%). The table shows two different treatments 
in terms of likely voter screening. The first is based on in-
dividual motivation variables (basically the respondent’s 
interest in the campaigns and his/her subjective prob-
ability of going to the polls, questions asked immediately 
before and after asking if the respondent knew the date of 
the election). As shown, screening for likely voters by the 
use of these individual motivation variables resulted in a 
slightly better estimate (a 1.3 average error and a maxi-
mum error of two points for the PRD) than the raw results. 
Nonetheless, the difference between first and second place 
(shown in the rightmost column) was actually widened by 
one absolute point, so the results were more accurate if 
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we use Mosteller 3, but not if we use another indicator of 
accuracy (like Mosteller 5). 
A second mode of likely voter screening that this poll 
offered reflects social or family motivation. This was based 
on the respondents’ perceived political environment in 
his/her household, that is, how much she/he reported that 
the family members talk about the candidates and their 
campaigns, and what is the respondent’s perceived prob-
ability that his/her family will turnout to vote on election 
day. Unlike the individual motivation variables, these family 
environment variables are based on the logic that voting 
is a social act and that Mexicans may be to some extent 
influenced by the environment they perceive at home. 
Other aspects such as the mobilization by parties or by 
other secondary groups were not considered in this poll. 
As shown, the estimation based on screening of likely 
voters by social/family motivation was not as accurate as 
the estimation that used screening of likely voters based 
on individual motivation. The average error in the social 
or family model was 2.0, and the difference between first 
and second place widened to four points (as opposed to 
three points in the individual motivation mode). In any 
case, the most noticeable error in both modes of likely voter 
screening had to do with underestimation of support for the 
leftist PRD, but estimates of both PRI and PAN improved 
in comparison with the raw poll results. 
Table 3 also shows the poll results broken down in 
two groups derived from an experimental design. In half 
of the interviews the voting question was asked near the 
beginning of the questionnaire (it was the sixth question 
out of 25), and in the other half it was asked later in the 
questionnaire (it was question number 24).16 This treat-
16 The voting question near the beginning was preceded by the perceived 
main problem in the municipality where the respondent lives, the 
Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 4 67
ment was applied alternating the type of questionnaire, 
one to one respondent and the other to the next. It was 
not applied by polling point, which would also have been 
useful for the type of analysis that we develop below. This 
experiment was conducted as a way to assess whether 
the placement of the voting question (before or after the 
respondent’s thinking about campaign issues) contributes 
to higher or lower levels of accuracy of the poll estimates. 
As shown in the table, the placement of the voting ques-
tion near the beginning (and prior to any further political 
reasoning) yielded a better poll estimate in this case, with an 
average error of 0.7 (the lowest of all average errors shown 
in the table), as compared to the average error of 2.7 derived 
from the late question placement. Without any possibility 
to generalize, this results suggest that an early and “clean” 
question about voting preference may be more helpful 
than one asked later and after other items that involve fur-
ther political or economic reasoning.17 Table 3 also shows 
the combinations of likely voter screening (by individual 
individual motivation likely voter items described earlier, and a ques-
tion that asked if the respondent had already decided his/her vote or 
whether she/he was still undecided at the time of the interview. The 
voting question placed later in the questionnaire was preceded by the 
respondent’s opinion about the candidates, exposure to campaign events, 
to the televised debates and assessments of the winner, the president 
and governor approval ratings, self-reported crime victimization and 
loss of job in the household, and confidence in the election authorities. 
17 The State of Mexico poll conducted by Reforma did not include an ex-
periment about asking voting preference with a secret-ballot method 
vs. asking it verbally and directly. Nonetheless, a similar pre-election 
poll conducted by Reforma/Mural for the Jalisco state governor race, in 
2006, included a somewhat similar exercise, yet not quite experimental. 
The voting question was asked at the beginning using a secret-ballot 
method and again at the end asking verbally and directly. The results 
from the question placed at the beginning with a secret-ballot method 
yielded better estimates of the election result than the question placed 
at the end which was asked directly. The problem with this poll is that 
both modes were asked to the same respondents, and there is no way 
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motivation only, since it proved to yield more accurate 
estimates in this poll) and the voting question placement 
(near the beginning and near the end). The combination 
of these two treatments increased the average error when 
screening for likely voters and asking voting preference 
near the beginning, in comparison to the estimates for each 
of these treatments separately. However, the combination 
improved the estimates slightly when the voting question 
was asked later, which means that the overall influence 
of likely voter screening may be beneficial to pre-election 
polls, regardless of whether they ask voting preference at 
the beginning or at the end. 
Finally, Table 3 also presents in its last row an estimate 
treatment that combines likely voters and weighting for the 
vote in the previous election. Weighting for prior vote is a 
common practice of pre-election polls in Spain, for example. 
It is based on the assumption that voting preferences do not 
change dramatically from one election to the next, an as-
sumption that may not apply to electorally volatile emerging 
democracies. In Mexico, state-level elections conducted by 
Reforma/El Norte in states where the PRI had a substantial 
lead, such as Coahuila and Durango, with support well over 
60%, the poll results actually overestimated an already high 
level of support for the PRI. In the State of Mexico this could 
have been the case, thereby inviting to consider the previous 
vote as an anchor. Following the experiences of Coahuila 
and Durango, Reforma’s final publication included both the 
raw results and the results derived from a projection that 
considered likely voter screening and weighted the results 
by prior vote (the most recent governor election of 2005) in 
the State of Mexico. This projection estimated the support 
to determine what the main cause of the inaccuracy was: the late pla-
cement, the direct question, or something else. 
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for the PRI at 59%.18 With the latter mode, the PRI was 
underestimated by six percentage points, and the opposi-
tion parties were overestimated by three percentage points 
each, for an average error of four points and a significantly 
lower difference between first and second place: 33 points, 
as compared to the final 42 points. (This illustrates that the 
influence of prior experiences in a current projection may 
also be among the sources of estimation error, but they are 
part of the data treatment and not the poll error in itself). 
Table 4. Pre-election poll estimates for the 2011 State of 
Mexico election published by four newspapers 
(All face-to-face polls except the GCE 
telephone tracking poll)
PRI PRD PAN Average error
Difference 
1st – 2nd
% % %
Official election 
results (99%) 65 23 12 -- 42
GCE/Milenio (te-
lephone tracking 
poll)
62 23 15 2.0 39
Reforma (raw 
results) 62 23 15 2.0 39
Reforma 
(projection) 59 26 15 4.0 33
El Universal 59 27 14 4.0 32
GCE/Milenio 
(face-to face) 61 20 18 4.3 41
BGC Beltrán / 
Excelsior 58 27 15 4.7 31
Note: Results are rounded up.
18 In 2005, the PRI candidate won the election for governor with 49%, 
whereas the PAN and PRD candidates obtained 26 and 25%, respectively.
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All other polls sponsored by newspapers also underes-
timated—to a greater or lesser extent—the PRI vote in the 
State of Mexico election, as shown in Table 4.19 The total 
average error for five pre-election poll estimates ranged 
from 2.0 to 4.7. Interestingly, a telephone tracking poll 
conducted by Gabinete de Comunicación Estratégica (GCE) 
for Milenio newspaper yielded comparatively accurate re-
sults—and much more accurate that the same firm’s face-to 
face poll. This raises the question about the accuracy and 
appropriateness of telephone vs. face-to-face polls. The 
State of Mexico experience cannot be generalized but in 
this case there was a difference in the polls results from 
the same organization. Undoubtedly, discussions about 
sources of error will have to add the mode of interview in 
the future (telephone vs. face-to-face). Among the reasons 
why telephone interviews are seldom used in Mexico for 
pre-election polls is the fact that residential telephone 
lines have a limited coverage and the fact that telephone 
polls have a bias towards higher socio-economic levels, not 
to mention urban settings, as opposed to rural ones. The 
telephone interviews fortuitous performance in the State 
of Mexico in 2011 may be explained by the fact that voters 
in several middle class districts that usually favor the PAN 
opted this time for the PRI, but this is just a speculation 
in our part. 
Let us now move on to the analysis of the poll’s sources 
of error. In the following two sections we list a series of 
hypotheses and then proceed to an empirical analysis with 
variables that attempt to represent each of the hypotheses 
proposed. 
19 Two newspapers, Reforma and El Universal, used their in-house polling 
units for the polls, whereas Milenio and Excelsior hired or established 
a collaboration scheme with polling firms GCE and BGC Beltrán, res-
pectively. 
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Hypotheses (and indicators)
There are several hypotheses that are usually pointed 
out as common sources of poll estimates error by Mexican 
pollsters and by observers of the polling profession in the 
country. In the remaining of the article we attempt to test 
some of those hypotheses using the poll conducted by 
Reforma in the 2011 State of Mexico election. 
The hypotheses that we attempt to test are the follow-
ing (preceded by an analytical category in capital letters as 
a way to classify the sources of error):
SAMPLE DESIGN:
As an essential part of polling, sampling is a natural 
source of error. There are various hypotheses that can be 
tested under this category, but the data at hand (which 
recorded whether the interview was an original selection 
or a substitution) allow us to test the following:
1. Substitution of the original sample respondents, for what-
ever reason related to sample non-response, increases the 
estimation error. 
In addition, we also test for the difference between 
urban and rural samples. We have no a priori expectation 
about this, although some pollsters argue that interviews 
in rural areas tend to yield less accurate estimates. 
QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN:
How the questionnaire is designed and how the ques-
tions are asked is also a natural source of error, in polls. In 
this analysis we test whether placing the voting question 
before and after the items that activate political and eco-
nomic reasoning affect the poll estimates. 
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1. Voting question placement affects the accuracy of poll 
estimates. 
1.1. Asking for voting preferences at the beginning of the 
interview increases poll accuracy because it measures a 
more spontaneous and “cleaner” response without the 
possible influence of other items in the questionnaire. 
1.2. Asking the voting question later in the question-
naire allows the respondent to take several factors into 
account during the interview before revealing his/her 
preference. The possible bias from this reasoning may 
be positive (1.2.1) or negative (1.2.2), thereby increasing 
or decreasing the accuracy of poll estimates.
SPIRAL OF SILENCE EFFECTS:
One of the favorite, most simple and most common 
hypothesis that Mexican pollsters use refers to situations 
where respondents don’t reveal their real preferences for 
some reason (“voters lie”, some pollsters say). Spiral of 
silence effects is a more formal way to represent this on 
the basis of a theory of survey response (Noelle-Newmann 
1974). Nonetheless, it is not an easy task to test for these 
effects. In this analysis we propose a way to do it according 
to the following hypothesis.
2. Spiral of silence effects take place especially when the re-
spondent perceives him or herself to be among the minority 
view. This perception may lead him/her to give socially 
desirable responses during the interview, including the 
vote preference. 
2.1. Perceiving oneself among the minority view increases 
the probability to give a socially desirable response and, 
therefore, to a higher inaccuracy of the poll estimates. 
2.2. Spiral of silence effects may be more noticeable 
when the respondent perceives that he/she is among 
the minority view in his/her closer community (where 
the pressure of social norms is higher) than when he/
she perceives him/herself to be among the minority in 
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a broader and more abstract community (say, the state 
as a whole). 
For the latter two hypotheses, the State of Mexico poll 
included two items right after the voting question that 
inquired whether the respondent believed his prefer-
ence to be among the minority or the majority view in 
his municipality and in the state as a whole. 
2.3. Spiral of silence effects are also present when the 
respondent perceives a potential pressure from the in-
terviewer. 
The Reforma poll in the State of Mexico also included 
a record of possible pressure felt by the respondent: Was 
there any situation during the interview in which the re-
spondent felt pressure or did not feel free to express his/
her opinions? Was there a moment when the respondent 
felt distrust towards the interviewer? Did the respondent 
think that the interviewer was working for a political party? 
An indicator of pressure was constructed from these indi-
cators, which were coded by the interviewer at the end of 
each interview. 
CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS:
The respondent in an interview (and also the inter-
viewer) may feel pressured or threatened by contextual 
effects, which refer to the general environment where the 
interview takes place. The increasing violence and crime, 
for example, have made face-to-face polls increasingly 
difficult in Mexico.20 An unsafe environment not only may 
affect the quality of an interview (and the responses) but 
20 WAPOR’s press release in early August 2011 about the disappearance of 
interviewers working for the Consulta-Mitofsky and Parametría polling 
firms in the State of Michoacan, Mexico, is a good illustration of this 
problem.
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also the work done by the interviewers, so it is a potential 
source of error. We hypothesize that: 
3. An unsafe or threatening environment in a polling point 
decreases the accuracy of poll estimates. 
INTERVIEW(ER) EFFECTS:
Among the many sources of error identified by Herbert 
Weisberg (2008) in his monograph of total survey error, 
interviewer effects are quite important. We also include 
the interview itself here as a way to have a broader set of 
possible sources of error. In this paper we test the direct 
interviewer effects (in this case represented by the sex and 
by the age of the interviewer, as well as by his/her inter-
viewing experience); the effects of direct supervision; and 
the effects of the length of interview. We hypothesize that:
4. The sex and age of interviewers may affect the poll estimates 
by increasing or decreasing the respondent’s confidence in the 
interview. We believe that female interviewers may have a 
more positive influence than male interviewers, especially in 
an environment where crime has increased, as it is the case 
in Mexico (as female interviewers may seem less threaten-
ing than male ones).
5. The interviewers experience may also affect the poll esti-
mates. We hypothesize that more experienced interviewers 
are more likely to increase poll accuracy than less experi-
enced ones. 
6. Direct supervision of the interview may contribute to in-
creasing the accuracy of poll estimates. We hypothesize that 
interviewers under close watch tend to do a better job dur-
ing their interviews. Of course, it is also feasible that direct 
supervision may increase pressure and affect negatively 
the poll estimates. 
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7. The length of interview affects the quality of response. We 
hypothesize that interviews that take longer than average 
(for whatever reason), tend to wear out the respondent, 
contributing to a decreasing quality of his/her responses. 
This hypothesis has different implications depending on 
the placement of the voting question. If our expectation 
is true, longer interviews should have a greater negative 
impact when the voting question is asked near the end of 
the questionnaire. 
“LAST MINUTE” CHANGE EFFECTS:
Given the relatively long periods that span between 
the fieldwork of a final pre-election poll that can be pub-
lished and the election day, forced by the prohibition to 
publish poll results, it is commonly argued that when polls 
are not very accurate it is because last minute changes 
of preference take place. We believe that even though in 
some cases this may be true, it does not always happen 
in Mexican elections. Much of the polling history in the 
country has been characterized by this legal restriction, 
and yet many pre-election polls achieve a high degree of 
accuracy, in some case not just considering the final poll, 
but starting with other earlier polls conducted through-
out the campaign.21 This hypothesis is difficult to test 
with the same pre-election polls that are constrained by 
the publication prohibition, but we can employ a proxy 
for this phenomenon: the undecided voters. They are 
the most likely to change (or form) a preference in the 
last few days prior to the election (and they are also the 
most likely to abstain). In the 2006 presidential election, 
for example, a small yet substantial proportion of voters 
21 The State of Mexico governor race of 2011 is a good example of how voter 
preferences changes very little during the campaign, as both polls and 
tracking polls showed almost null variation.
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said in a national exit poll that they had decided to vote 
for Felipe Calderón in the few days prior to the election, 
and certainly after all public polls were already published 
(see Moreno 2009b). 
We hypothesize that:
8. “Last minute” changes of preference may take place and 
affect the poll estimates. (In this case, our proxy for “last min-
ute” changes is represented by respondents who declared 
themselves as undecided).
Other hypotheses that are important but that we cannot 
test in this paper with the data at hand are the following, 
hoping that they can be tested in future studies:
9. The use of a secret-ballot method vs. asking voting prefer-
ences directly influence the interviewer’s response. 
9.1. A secret-ballot method helps the respondent feel 
more confident about the anonymity and confidentiality 
of his/her response, thereby increasing the accuracy of 
the poll estimates.
9.2. A direct question seems as a less informal and of-
ficial act during the interview and helps the respondent 
express their preference under less pressure. 
10. The screening of likely voters makes a difference in the 
poll estimates. There are two opposing views about likely 
voters in Mexico:
10.1. Screening for likely voters is crucial in Mexico 
because voting is compulsory but without a sanction, 
turnout rates are comparatively low and, in addition, 
turnout rates have been decreasing over time. Screen-
ing for likely voters improves poll accuracy in Mexico. 
10.2. Screening for likely voters is useless in Mexico be-
cause people’s responses about the likelihood of voting 
are not reliable and they do not take into account the 
mobilization of parties on election day. Screening for 
likely voters does not affect (or may even decrease) poll 
accuracy in Mexico.
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Although different items for the screening for likely 
voters were included in the State of Mexico poll, as dis-
cussed earlier, for their proper testing an experimental 
design is needed, where half of the polling points use likely 
voter items and half do not. (We were not able to do this 
experimental analysis but it would be possible to test this 
hypothesis by randomly dividing the polling points into two 
groups. For the control group the analysis can report the 
raw results of electoral preferences, while for the treated 
group the analysis could apply the screening questions to 
report these preferences). 
Results
The results of our analysis are shown in Table 5. This 
table shows the results of OLS regression in which the 
dependent variable is the total error per polling point, 
that is, the total difference in absolute terms between the 
election official result in the precinct (or electoral section) 
and the result obtained by the poll in that polling point.22 
We will comment first on each independent variable as it 
appears in the table, and then we will make more general 
comments about this analysis. Because the dependent vari-
able is measured as the total error in absolute value, larger 
values represent a bigger error, and zero means no error. 
Consequently, positive signs of the coefficients represent 
a positive contribution to bigger error, and negative signs 
a contribution to accuracy (or smaller error). The results 
are shown in four columns, one for the total average error 
22 A single polling point certainly cannot not be a representative sample 
of a larger precinct, but it should reflect a general trend. In this analysis 
we assume that the polling point error can be a matter of sampling, and 
yet assess the effects of other variables in the total error. 
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for the three political parties, and the other three for each 
of the parties separately.
Let us discuss the variables that represent sampling 
effects. First, the substitution of original sample respondents 
did not have a significant effect on the poll’s total error. In 
this poll, about 24 percent of the original sample (which 
was unable to contact or who refused the interview) was 
substituted. As the results show, this substitution did not 
contribute to increasing the poll estimates’ error. Secondly, 
and against prior belief, the rural sample actually increased 
accuracy of the estimation of support for PRI and PRD. This 
had an incidence in the overall accuracy shown in the first 
column. This is perhaps explained by the fact that the PRI 
vote was high in all settings but proportionately higher in 
the rural settings, whereas the PRD vote was proportionally 
higher in urban areas, particularly in municipalities that 
are part of the Mexico City metropolitan belt. The PAN did 
not show any substantial differences in support by urban-
rural setting, which is interesting for those who know the 
electoral history of the state, where PAN candidates have 
traditionally drawn more support in the metropolitan belt 
as well. 
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Table 5. Testing various hypotheses for poll 
estimation error: OLS regression
 
Total 
absolute 
error
Absolute 
error for 
PRI
Absolute 
error for 
PAN
Absolute 
error for 
PRD
t Sig. t Sig. t Sig. t Sig.
Sampling effects
Substitute sample 0.93 0.49 0.41 1.48
Rural sample -2.55 * -2.87 ** 1.28 -4.57 ***
Questionnaire design
Voting question at 
the beginning -0.37 -0.04 -0.82 -0.08
Spiral of silence 
effects
Minority view in 
municipality 0.19 -0.40 2.35 * -1.60
Minority view in the 
state -0.19 0.40 -1.53 0.65
Pressure interview 3.11 ** 3.40 ** 1.67 1.92 *
Contextual effects
Unsafe polling point -1.38 -0.25 -3.79 *** 0.81
Interview(er) effects
Female interviewer -4.60 *** -5.27 *** -5.68 *** 1.31
Age of interviewer -1.08 -4.09 *** 2.99 ** -0.40
Experience of 
interviewer -0.83 -0.34 0.75 -2.79 **
Supervised interview -3.14 ** -2.99 ** 0.61 -5.32 ***
Length of interview 0.87 0.21 0.74 1.35
Last minute change 
effects
Undecided -1.44 -0.99 -1.80 -0.59
(Constant) 13.22 *** 12.80 *** 7.73 *** 9.95 ***
ADJ R-SQ .04 .06 .05 .05
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.
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The fact that we did not observe significant sampling 
effects in this analysis does not mean that they are not 
present. More research that takes different sampling issues 
into account should expand our evaluation of the sampling 
effects on poll accuracy. 
The placement of the voting question at the beginning 
seemed to have contributed to more accuracy than the 
voting question placed later in the questionnaire, but this 
effect was not statistically significant when controlled by 
other factors. In this sense, questionnaire design effects 
on accuracy or inaccuracy were not observed at the ag-
gregate level; nevertheless there are significant effects if 
we dissagregate the sample by demographics
We find significant differences among specific seg-
ments of the population. Table 6 shows the difference on 
voting preferences between the group interviewed with the 
voting question at the beginning of the questionnaire and 
the group with the voting question later in the questionnaire. 
Men are positively influenced towards the PAN candidate 
when the voting question is placed at the middle-end of 
the questionnaire. Women significantly decrease their item 
non-response rate when the voting question is located at 
the beginning of the questionnaire.
Table 6. Differences on preferences due to voting question 
placement (beginning minus middle placement) by sex
Men Women
PAN Candidate -6.1** 1.5
PRI/PVEM/NA Candidate 4.2 2.7
PRD/PT/Conv. Candidate 2.6 2.2
NA -1.3 -5.4**
We also verified for effects by education. One would 
expect that questionnaire effects would be bigger on the 
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less educated, since this segment of the electorate should 
have less information and is more reliable on other people’s 
opinions to decide. Table 7 shows the differences between 
both groups in the sample. The largest effects—although 
not strongly significant—are on the PRI candidate, if asked 
about their electoral preference at the beginning of the 
questionnaire, those with no formal education and those 
with college education were much more likely to vote for 
the PRI, which is a peculiar result. The effect on uneducated 
citizens is twice of what we observe for undergraduates. 
The opposite effect that we find is on the PAN candidate 
among citizens with elementary school.
Table 7. Differences on preferences due to 
voting question placement (beginning minus 
middle placement) by formal education
PAN PRI PRD NA Abs. Avg. effect by education
None -2.1 20.9* -2.1 -6.6 7.9
Elementary -6.0** 6.4 -1.9 -3.2 4.4
Secondary 0.4 -6.6 4.4 -1.0 3.1
High School/
Technical -1.9 6.0 4.0 -4.9* 4.2
College -4.9 10.4* 5.1 0.9 5.3
Graduate 12.5 1.1 -20.5 -9.1 10.8
Abs. Avg. effect 
by candidate 4.6 8.6 6.3 4.3
Spiral of silence effects, represented by the respon-
dents’ perception of being among the minority view, were 
generally insignificant with the exception of the PAN. The 
respondents’ perception of being a minority in their own 
municipality actually increased the total error for the PAN 
estimates. In contrast, perception of being a minority in 
the overall state did not have any significant effect on the 
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poll’s total error. We looked more closely into whether 
spiral of silence effects had a greater effect on older people 
and women as the theory predicts (Noelle-Neuman 1974; 
Scheufele 2008). For this purpose we ran the same models 
with multiplicative terms for age, gender, and whether the 
respondents felt they were among the minority position in 
their state and municipality.23 As graphs 1 through 3 show 
the interactions effects were only significant in three cases: 
for the PAN when respondents felt they were among the 
minority view within their municipality, and for the PRD 
in the case respondents felt among the minority both at 
the state and municipal levels.24 
In the case of the PRD the marginal effect of respon-
dents’ perception of being in the minority in the state is 
negative and statistically significant25 for women between 18 
and 31 years old and after 77 years of age when compared 
to men. In the case of younger women, as expected, their 
marginal effect on the error term is significantly higher than 
that for men. Older women behave contrary to the gender 
expectation, as the marginal effect of feeling among the 
minority view of the state is less than that of men. Younger 
male respondents (18-37 years of age) who perceive their 
preference to be within the minority view in their munici-
pality tend to be significantly less prone to hide their true 
PRD preference than women from their cohort. In this 
case, in contrast to the two others, the age expectation 
(younger people will not care about being among the minor-
ity when expressing their opinion) is met, as the marginal 
effect curves have a positive (instead of a negative) slope. 
23 The models are in the appendix.
24 In order to find whether interaction effects are significant is necessary 
to include the main effect of their components. A clear way fo doing it 
is by presenting the marginal effects of both the interaction and main 
variables (Brambor et al. 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007).
25 Significance levels are set to at a p-value≤0.05
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Finally, in the case of the PAN, we can see that is younger 
men (18-40 years old) who tend to significantly hide their 
true opinion if they think they are in the minority in their 
municipality when compared to women of the same age. 
Graph 1 
Marginal Effect of Respondent’s Perception 
of Minority Status within the State, by 
age and gender, on the PRD Error
Graph 2 
Marginal Effect of Respondent’s Perception 
of Minority Status within the Municipality, 
by age and gender, on the PRD Error
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Graph 3 
Marginal Effect of Respondent’s Perception 
of Minority Status within the Municipality, 
by age and gender, on the PAN Error
This provides some evidence to our hypothesis that 
local-level community societal pressure matters more than 
in a broader and more abstract community (state or country). 
The only case where respondents’ perception of the status of 
their opinion within the state mattered was for supporters of 
the party which came last in the elections. We also found that 
spiral of silence effects differed depending on the age and sex 
of the respondents. The theory predicts that younger people 
will feel freer to express their views regardless of whether they 
felt were with the majority or minority. We found this was 
just the case for the PRD error when respondents thought 
they were in the minority at the community level. In terms 
of gender, depending on the respondents’ age, sometimes 
women would express more their true preference than men. 
The fact that the parties with the lowest support in the elec-
tion are the ones for which spiral of silence effects took place 
is telling about this source of error among actual minorities. 
According to the poll results, two-thirds of PAN voters believed 
that the PRI candidate would win the election. Among PRD 
voters this perception was slightly lower. 
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Interestingly, the variable that represents pressures 
during the interview was statistically significant in all 
cases but the PAN, suggesting that this type of pressures 
may not quite reflect a spiral of silence effect but a direct 
interview(er) bias. In the cases of PRI and PRD (although 
more noticeable in the former), feeling some type of pres-
sure by the interview(er) contributed to increase the poll’s 
error. The more pressure the respondent felt, the more likely 
he or she said s/he would vote for the PRI. The combination 
of results from these Spiral of Silence variables suggests that 
social norms and social pressure may actually have signifi-
cant effects on accuracy of poll estimates in the country, 
and more research in this direction should be conducted. 
The influence of an unsafe environment in the poll 
accuracy was generally insignificant, with the exception of 
the PAN support. As the results show, conducting interviews 
in polling points perceived as unsafe or potentially unsafe 
(about 20% of all polling points) increased the accuracy of 
the estimates for PAN support. This finding goes against our 
theoretical expectation, that an unsafe environment would 
increase the polls’ inaccuracy. We do not find either higher 
non-response rates in unsafe polling points or significant 
differences on estimates for other relevant variables. While 
it is true that polling is becoming a high risk job for in-
terviewers, we find no evidence that this circumstance is 
affecting the survey estimates. The subsample of citizens 
that, despite the unsafe context, chose to answer a poll 
tends to distribute just like the rest of the sample.
The analysis shown in Table 7 indicates that interview(er) 
effects did take place in different forms. Let us discuss one 
by one in the order in which the independent variables 
appear in the table. First, the sex of the interviewer mat-
ters. (It represents the stronger predictor of accuracy in the 
estimation of PRI and PAN support). Female interviewers 
contributed significantly to the poll accuracy, as shown by 
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the negative sign for the coefficients for support for PRI and 
PAN, but the effect was the opposite and insignificant in 
the case of the PRD. 
The age of the interviewer also shows a statistically 
significant contribution to accuracy but with mixed results. 
The sign is negative in the case of the PRI, which means that 
older interviewers had better results in the estimates for 
that party; and it was positive in the case of the PAN, with 
younger interviewers getting better estimates for that party. 
Our interpretation of this is that identification between the 
respondent and the interviewer may contribute to better 
estimates; for example, PAN voters are usually younger than 
PRI voters. However, the State of Mexico election breaks 
with this association, since the PRI drew more support 
among younger voters than it is usually observed. 
The interviewer’s experience only shows significant 
effects in the case of the PRD support. A statistically sig-
nificant coefficient with a negative sign in this case sug-
gests that more experienced interviewers (those who have 
participated in more polls and have a longer experience 
doing fieldwork) actually got better estimates for that party. 
This is an interesting finding, considering that many pre-
election polls in the past have underestimated support for 
the leftist party in some instances. 
The direct supervision of interviewers also contributes 
significantly to the polls accuracy, especially in the cases of 
PRI and PRD. (It results in the largest t score for the latter 
party’s estimates). According to this analysis, supervision 
decreases the poll estimate error. In contrast, the length of the 
interview (which had an average time of 12.5 minutes, and a 
median of 11 minutes, with a few interviews that lasted more 
than 30 and 40 minutes) does not contribute significantly to 
the poll estimates’ accuracy. Since the questionnaire only 
had 35 questions, longer interviews may have reflected 
some interruptions or factors that made them longer but 
Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 4 87
not necessarily less accurate. Both the respondents’ and 
the interviewers’ age contribute to make interviews that 
are longer on average: The older the respondent (or the 
older the interviewer), the longer the interview. Of course, 
the longest interviews are those among older respondents 
and older interviewers, with an average duration of 14.6 
minutes in this study, two more minutes on average than 
the overall poll average, or 16% longer. 
Finally, our analysis does not provide any evidence 
that “last minute” changes took place or were significant 
in the 2011 State of Mexico election, and therefore they did 
not contribute to the poll’s estimation error. This does not 
mean that last minute effects do not take place. Perhaps 
they are more likely to contribute to the polls’ inaccuracy in 
more contested elections (the State of Mexico election had 
a 42 point difference between the first and second place). 
The 2010 state elections, for example, were more contested 
races, and last minutes changes may have contributed to 
the poll errors, as argued by Estévez (2010). But we do not 
have a way to prove it in this article, so this could be a task 
for future research, obtaining some of the polls conducted 
by polling firms that year (if they offer a way to have a proxy 
indicator of last minute changes), or designing an exit poll 
that measures those effects for future elections. 
From the analysis shown in Table 5, we can argue that 
no single factor explains the inaccuracy of poll results, but 
a combination of factors that include sampling, interviewer 
biases and supervision, the context of an interview, and 
Spiral-of-Silence type of biases. Overall, interviewer effects 
(especially the sex and age of the interviewer) and interviewer 
supervision were among the chief explanatory factors of 
accuracy in the State of Mexico poll that we analyzed. In 
contrasts, spiral of silence and last minute change effects 
were rather moderate, and so were the sampling and ques-
tionnaire design. It is true that our analysis is generally weak 
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in its empirical foundations (as evidenced not only by the 
low R squares, but also by the fact that it is based on one poll 
in one election that was hardly contested). Still, it is a first 
formal step in what we hope to be a broader and more col-
lective search for the main sources of polling error in Mexico.
Final discussion
What are the main conclusions from this analysis and in 
which direction should further research go? The purpose of 
this article is to start a discussion and continue the analyses of 
possible sources of errors in pre-election surveys in Mexico. 
As a young democracy this type of studies might also help us 
understand issues of pre-electoral polls in new democracies. 
Based on the empirical evidence, limited to one local election, 
we can point out to a mix of factors that affect poll accuracy: 
some interviewer effects, contextual factors, as well as spiral 
of silence variables. In our attempt to test more hypotheses, 
further research should also focus on sampling effects, al-
ternative methods to ask the voting question, alternative 
methods of data gathering, interviewer effects, supervision 
effects, contextual effects (crime and unsafe polling points), 
spiral of silence effects, and screening of likely voters. 
In order to expand this research it would be convenient 
to draw evidence from a set of pre-electoral polls conducted 
in different campaigns or one survey that draws represen-
tative samples from electoral areas with different levels of 
competition. This would allow us to compare the effect of 
different factors that might affect the measurement of vote 
choice at different levels of competitiveness. This set of polls 
might include different experimental designs to measure the 
set of causes we found significant in this study to explain the 
discrepancy between the pre-electoral polls and the final 
election results. Finally, an exit poll could help us assess the 
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amount of people, who in different contexts decides the direc-
tion of their vote within two or one week before the election. 
Our findings give us some hints about the estimation 
errors of 2010, but that collective experience is still in need 
for a more complete explanation. In addition to the methods 
and possible effects that we have proposed, there are also 
other possibilities that may complement the overall picture. 
For example, Traugott and Wlezien (2011) argue that it has 
been difficult in the United States to estimate support for 
what they call “insurgent candidates”. In the states where the 
PRI lost in 2010 against a left-right coalition, the candidate 
was actually a popular former PRI member that broke away 
from the governing party as a result of different disputes. It 
would be interesting to discuss whether this could apply as 
an “insurgent” effect and whether such category is found 
useful in Mexico. If yes, it is possible that an insurgent 
candidate may in fact reflect spiral of silence effects. Another 
possibility raised by Traugott and Wlezien as a source 
for estimation error is that it is very difficult to capture 
“momentum”. This elusive phenomenon can take place in 
different moments of a campaign and it can certainly build 
up as the election approaches. The presence of momentum 
at the end of a campaign may be different to last minutes 
changes, since there may be a trend building up from before 
instead of just a spontaneous change. 
The polling activity in Mexico has evolved with firm steps 
and setbacks. The estimation errors observed in 2010 certainly 
damaged the profession’s credibility. However, polls remain 
a vital element of electoral life in the country. We believe that 
polls should be strengthened, as they serve a noble role of 
informing the citizens. We hope that the analyses and results 
discussed in this article serve the polling profession to revise 
its methodologies and reassess their work, not because they 
have expired or become useless, but because the object of 
study they try to capture is a dynamic one, always changing 
and reflecting new realities.
90 Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 4
References
American National Election Studies, ANES (2007), Time of 
presidential election vote decision1948–2004, retrieved 
September 8, 2011, from http://www.electionstudies.
org/nesguide/toptable/tab9a_3.htm.
Basáñez, Miguel (1995), “Public Opinion Polling in Mexico”, 
In Peter H. Smith (ed.), Latin America In Comparative 
Perspective: New Approaches To Methods And Analysis. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Brambor, Thomas, William R. Clark, and Matt Golder (2006), 
“Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical 
Analyses”, Political Analysis, vol. 14 no. 1:63-82.
Kam, Cindy K. and Robert J. Franzese, Jr. (2007), Modeling and 
Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis. 
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Magalhães, Pedro (2005), “Pre-Election Polls in Portugal: 
Accuracy, Bias, and Sources of Error, 1991-2004”, 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, vol. 
17, no. 4: 399-421. 
Moreno, Alejandro (2009a), “Encuestas y elecciones en México: 
La precisión de estimaciones preelectorales en un con-
texto de cambio” [Polls and elections in Mexico: The ac-
curacy of pre-election estimates in a changing context], 
paper presented at the Second WAPOR Latin American 
Congress, Lima, Peru, 22-24 April.
Moreno, Alejandro (2009b), La decisión electoral: votantes, 
partidos y democracia en México [Electoral Choice: Voters, 
Parties and Democracy in Mexico], Mexico City, Miguel 
Angel Porrua. 
Nir, Lilach and James Druckman (2008), “Campaign Mixed 
Message Flows and Timing of Vote Decision”, International 
Journal of Public Opinion, vol. 20, nr. 3: 326-346.
Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth (1993 [1984]), The Spiral of Silence: 
Public Opinion, Our Social Skin, 2nd edition, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 
Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 4 91
Przeworski, Adam (1991), Democracy and the Market: Political 
and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Reuters, 17 April 2007, Poll: Nearly half of French voters un-
decided. [URL: http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/
europe/04/09/france.election. poll.reut/index.html.]
Romero, Vidal, and Carlo Varela (2011), “La precisión de las 
encuestas preelectorales” [Pree-election poll accuracy (in 
Mexico)], Última Instancia: Revista de Estudios Jurídico 
Electorales, Vol. 2, No. 0, Summer. Pp: 30-37.
Romero, Vidal (Forthcoming), “Notas para la evaluación de las 
encuestas preelectorales: Las elecciones para gobernador 
de 2010 en México”, Política y Gobierno. 
Sartori, Giovanni (1976), Parties and Party Systems, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Schmitt-Beck, R. and T. Faas (2006), “The campaign and its 
dynamics at the 2005 German general election”, German 
Politics, nr. 15: 393–419.
Scheufele, Dietram A. (2008), “Spiral of Silence Theory”, in 
Wolfgang Donsbach y Michael W. Traugott (eds.), The 
Sage Handbook of Public Opinion Research. London, Sage.
Traugott, Michael (2005), “The Accuracy of the National 
Preelection Polls in the 2004 Presidential Election”, Public 
Opinion Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 5, special issue: 642-54. 
Traugott, Michael, and Christopher Wlezien (2011), “Media 
Coverage as a Contextual Explanation for Estimation 
Errors in Pre-Primary Polls in the United States”, paper 
presented at the 64th Annual Conference of the World 
Association for Public Opinion Research, WAPOR, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September 21-23.
Weisberg, Herbert (2008), “The Methodological Strengths and 
Weaknesses of Survey Research”, in Wolfgang Donsbach 
and Michael Traugott (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Public 
Opinion Research, London, Sage.
Zaller, John (2004), “Floating voters in U.S. Presidential elec-
tions, 1948-2000”, in P. M. Sniderman and W. E. Saris 
(eds.), Studies in Public Opinion, Princeton, NJ, Princeton 
University Press.
92 Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 4
A
pp
en
di
x
Ta
bl
e 
A
.1
. T
es
tin
g 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
eff
ec
ts
 fo
r S
pi
ra
l o
f S
ile
nc
e 
hy
po
th
es
es
: O
LS
 re
gr
es
si
on
To
ta
l 
ab
so
lu
-
te
 e
rr
or
Ab
so
lu
te
 
er
ro
r f
or
 
PR
I
Ab
so
lu
te
 
er
ro
r f
or
 
PA
N
Ab
so
lu
te
 
er
ro
r f
or
 
PR
D
 
t
Si
g.
t
Si
g.
t
Si
g.
t
Si
g.
Sa
m
pl
in
g 
eff
ec
ts
Su
bs
tit
ut
e 
sa
m
pl
e
0.
87
0.
49
0.
48
1.
48
Ru
ra
l s
am
pl
e
-2
.3
8
*
-2
.8
7
**
1.
45
-4
.5
7
**
*
Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 d
es
ig
n
Vo
tin
g 
qu
es
tio
n 
at
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g
-0
.3
6
-0
.0
4
-0
.6
2
-0
.0
8
Sp
ira
l o
f s
ile
nc
e 
eff
ec
ts
M
in
or
ity
 v
ie
w
 in
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
0.
25
0.
04
2.
19
*
-1
.8
9
M
in
or
ity
 v
ie
w
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 +
 A
ge
-0
.3
6
-0
.3
5
-1
.5
6
1.
33
M
in
or
ity
 v
ie
w
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 +
 F
em
al
e
-0
.0
0
0.
06
-0
.5
3
0.
52
M
in
or
ity
 v
ie
w
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 +
 F
em
al
e 
+ 
Ag
e
0.
18
0.
20
0.
39
-0
.2
4
M
in
or
ity
 v
ie
w
 in
 th
e 
st
at
e
-0
.3
8
-0
.5
8
-1
.2
0
1.
19
M
in
or
ity
 v
ie
w
 s
ta
te
 +
 A
ge
0.
08
0.
52
0.
56
-1
.2
5
M
in
or
ity
 v
ie
w
 s
ta
te
 +
 F
em
al
e
1.
29
1.
17
0.
89
0.
95
Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 4 93
M
in
or
ity
 v
ie
w
 s
ta
te
 +
 F
em
al
e 
+ 
Ag
e
0.
99
-0
.9
7
-0
.5
1
-0
.8
0
Pr
es
su
re
 in
te
rv
ie
w
3.
11
**
3.
42
**
1.
40
2.
13
*
Co
nt
ex
tu
al
 e
ffe
ct
s
U
ns
af
e 
po
lli
ng
 p
oi
nt
-1
.3
1
-0
.2
9
-3
.4
8
**
*
0.
68
In
te
rv
ie
w
(e
r)
 e
ffe
ct
s
Fe
m
al
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
er
-4
.5
0
**
*
-5
.1
5
**
*
-5
.7
4
**
*
1.
51
Ag
e 
of
 in
te
rv
ie
w
er
-1
.0
1
-4
.0
4
**
*
3.
03
**
-0
.3
9
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
of
 in
te
rv
ie
w
er
-0
.7
8
-0
.2
5
0.
50
-2
.6
9
**
Su
pe
rv
is
ed
 in
te
rv
ie
w
-3
.1
1
**
-3
.0
1
**
0.
79
-5
.4
4
**
*
Le
ng
th
 o
f i
nt
er
vi
ew
0.
75
0.
32
0.
17
1.
51
La
st
 m
in
ut
e 
ch
an
ge
 e
ffe
ct
s
To
ta
l 
ab
so
lu
-
te
 e
rr
or
Ab
so
lu
te
 
er
ro
r f
or
 
PR
I
Ab
so
lu
te
 
er
ro
r f
or
 
PA
N
Ab
so
lu
te
 
er
ro
r f
or
 
PR
D
 
t
Si
g.
t
Si
g.
t
Si
g.
t
Si
g.
U
nd
ec
id
ed
-1
.3
3
-0
.9
7
-1
.6
0
-0
.5
4
Re
sp
on
de
nt
’s 
ag
e
0.
79
-0
.0
8
2.
36
*
-0
.3
5
Fe
m
al
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
-0
.2
8
-0
.3
3
0.
31
-0
.6
6
Re
sp
on
de
nt
’s 
ag
e 
+ 
Fe
m
al
e
0.
08
-0
.0
7
-0
.5
6
0.
34
(C
on
st
an
t)
8.
33
**
*
17
.6
2
**
*
3.
62
**
*
9.
05
**
*
A
D
J 
R-
SQ
 
.0
4
.0
6
.0
5
.0
5
Si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
 le
ve
ls
: *
 p
<.
05
; *
* 
p
<.
01
; *
**
 p
<.
0
